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Abstra t
The Zheng-Seberry (ZS) en ryption s heme was published in 1993
and was one of the rst pra ti al s hemes that was onsidered se ure
against a hosen iphertext adversary. This paper shows some problems that the semanti se urity of the one-way hash variant of the ZS
s heme is inse ure on some spe ial ir umstan es. Attempts to modify
the ZS s heme resulted on an El-Gamal variant that is provably se ure
in the random ora le model.
1

Introdu tion

In 1993 Zheng-Seberry [9℄ presented a paper introdu ing three new publi key en ryption s hemes that were eÆ ient and onsidered se ure against
a hosen iphertext adversary, under some assumptions. Sin e then mu h
progress has made in the area of provable se urity for publi -key ryptosystems, from those that use the Random Ora le (RO) model [2℄ to the s heme
by Cramer-Shoup (CS) [4℄ that is provably se ure using standard publi key
ryptography assumptions.
Using the RO model or standard assumptions represent opposite ends
of the provable se urity spe trum. The RO model yields extremely eÆ ient
s hemes yet pra ti al implementations using hash fun tions fall short of
a tual RO's. Using standard assumptions gives us tremendous on den e
in se urity yet s hemes are still too ineÆ ient for the majority of pra ti al
implementations.
1

The hardness of the DiÆe-Hellman de ision problem is essentially equivalent to the semanti se urity of basi El-Gamal en ryption s heme [5℄. The
basi El-Gamal s heme is ompletely inse ure against adaptive hosen iphertext atta k. This new Se ure El-Gamal s heme was born out of the
OWH variant of the original ZS s heme, sin e as shall be seen in se tion 2.2
it is inse ure against a hosen iphertext adversary (CCA). Se uring the ZS
s heme meant providing a proof for se urity and the best proof (in that it
requires the least assumptions) was that by Cramer-Shoup. Unfortunately
the CS proof annot easily be used to prove the se urity of Se ure El-gamal.
So se tion 3 presents the new Se ure El-Gamal s heme, and a proof of seurity whi h borrows many parts of the CS proof. Unfortunately, the proof
still needs to rely on the random ora le model, but en ouragingly, it only
relies on it in a minimal way.
It has be ome standard pra ti e that the level of se urity required for a
publi -key ryptosystem is indistinguishability of en ryptions, IND, (equivalently semanti se urity or non-malleability) against an adaptive hosen
iphertext adversary (CCA2), for formal de nitions see [1℄. The basi idea
behind an IND-CCA2 adversary is that they are given a ess to an en ryption and de ryption ora le, they then hoose two messages, one of whi h
gets en rypted (they do not know whi h). They are then presented with
the iphertext of the en rypted message and asked to determine whi h of
the two messages was en rypted. They must su eed with probability nonnegligibly better than 0.5. The only restri tion is the adversary may not
query the de ryption ora le with the hallenge iphertext.
2

Original ZS

The ZS paper presented three variants of an El-Gamal like ryptosystem.
The three variants were des ribed as `immunising' the ryptosystem against
a CCA2 adversary. The variants in orporated a one-way hash fun tion
(OWH), a universal hash fun tion and a digital signature.
2.1

ZS-OWH

The ZS-OWH variant is presented below.
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ZS-OWH

Preliminaries:

Consider message of length n, a one-way hash fun tion H
with output length k0 and a PRNG G with output length n + k0 .
Operations are modulo p and there is a generator g.

Key Generation:

2 GF (p) and publi

Private key is x

En ryption;

R

1; x 2 [1; p 1℄
2;
3; t = H (m)
4; 1 = g
5;
Ciphertext is ( 1 ; 2 )
R

x

z

key is y = g R mod p.
R

= G(y )[1

2

x
R

K

x

(n+k0 )℄

= z  (mjjt)

De ryption:

1; z 0 = G( 1 R )[1 ( + 0 )℄ 2; w = z 0  2
3; m = w[1 ℄
4; t0 = w[( +1) (
If H (m) = t0 , then output m else output ;.
x

K

n

k

:::n

n

K n+k0 )℄

The se urity of ZS-OWH depends on the hardness of DiÆe-Hellman one
way problem.
2.2

Breaking ZS-OWH in IND-CCA2 Sense

\Due to the involvement of t = H (m), the reation of the
iphertext is apparently impossible without the knowledge of x
and m. : : :. This motivates us to introdu e a notion alled
sole samplable spa e." ([9℄, pg. 721)
If the authors had to pi k an assumption in the ZS paper that ultimately
turned out to be in orre t, the above assumption would be an appropriate
hoi e. As it turns out an adversary an reate a new iphertext from an
existing iphertext, if the message in the existing iphertext is known.
To see how this is a hieved onsider the last part of the iphertext,
2

= z  (mjjt) = z  (mjjH (m));

whi h just depends on the message. So if the message is known, this part
of the iphertext an be re reated. If the adversary wishes to repla e the
message m with another message m0 , this an be a hieved via:

0 =
2

2

 (mjjH (m))  (m0jjH (m0 ))
3

 (mjjH (m))  (mjjH (m))  (m0jjH (m0 ))
z  [(mjjH (m))  (mjjH (m))℄  (m0 jjH (m0 ))
z  (m0 jjH (m0 ));
in whi h [(mjjH (m))  (mjjH (m))℄ = 0 due to Boolean addition.
=
=
=

z

The new iphertext is ( 1 ; 02 ) and the adversary is su essful in manipulating the ryptosystem.
This atta k an be used by a CCA2 adversary to defeat IND and the
adversary su eeds 100% of the time. In this situation the adversary does not
know whi h of two messages, m0 or m1 , has been en rypted, but they know
one of them has been. Let the en rypted message be m where b 2 [0; 1℄.
The adversary uses the above atta k by setting m = m0 and m0 = m1 and
reates a new ryptogram via:
b

0 =
2
=
=

 [m jjH (m )℄  [m jjH (m )℄
z  [m jjH (m )℄  [m jjH (m )℄  [m jjH (m )℄
z  [m: jjH (m: )℄
2

0

b

0

1

0

b

b

1

0

1

1

b

Hen e the adversary reates a new iphertext ( 1 ; 02 ), whi h is a valid iphertext for the message that was not en rypted in the hallenge iphertext.
Sin e the adversary is a CCA2 adversary, and the new iphertext is not the
hallenge iphertext, they may query the de ryption ora le with it. The deryption ora le will dutifully return the message that was not en rypted, m ,
and the adversary makes their hoi e for b as orresponding to the message
not returned by the de ryption ora le.
The ZS-OWH s heme is largely of theoreti al value to the ryptographi
ommunity, so while breaking the s heme does not have many pra ti al
impli ations, it is still of theoreti al use. This break highlights the importan e of adding random information to the he k on the message, as shall
be shown. Also, as re ently as EUROCRYPT 2000, a paper [6℄ made referen e to the ZS paper with the impli ation being it was se ure, under some
assumptions. So this atta k means ZS-OWH now needs to be added to the
list of s hemes that were onsidered se ure but turned out to be inse ure.
This atta k on ZS-OWH is a very trivial one and as ould be expe ted
a trivial hange to the s heme thwarts this atta k. By simply reating a
new variable r = y and hanging t = H (mjjr), then the atta k no longer
works. The hange in orporates some randomness into the hash al ulation
and thus defeats the above atta k as the adversary an no longer reate the
on atenation of message and hash be ause the adversary does not know the
b

x
R
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random information. This hange defeats the above atta k, but of ourse
does not prove the se urity of the s heme.
This hange was borrowed from an authenti ated-en ryption version of
ZS-OWH by Zheng [8℄, however Zheng stresses that the hanges made are
only needed for the new s heme proposed and that the original s heme is
se ure.
3

Se ure El-Gamal

The atta k and the repair of the original ZS-OWH leaves a rather large
question mark over its se urity. Se uring the original ZS-OWH s heme led
to a new El-Gamal variant. Great e orts were made to prove the se urity
of this new variant using the CS proof and thus derive a s heme that was
se ure under some reasonable assumptions, but without using the RO model.
Unfortunately, this goal was not realised, but en ouragingly the proof does
not heavily rely on the RO model.

Se ure El-Gamal

Preliminaries:

Consider messages of length n k0 , a random ora le H with output
length k0 . Operations are modulo p where p = 2q + 1 (q is a prime)
and a generator g of order q.

Key Generation:

Private key is x 2 GF (p) and publi key is y = g R mod p.
En ryption: En rypt message m as follows;
1; x 2 [1; p 1℄
2; r = y
3; t = H (mjjr)
4; 1 = g
5; 3 = r  (mjjt)2
Ciphertext is ( 1 ; 3 ).
R

R

x

x
R

R

x

De ryption:

1; r0 = q1 R
2; w = 3 ( hoose square root that yields the orre t hash)
3; m = w[1( 0 )℄
4; t0 = w[( 0 +1) ℄
0
0
If H (mjjr ) = t , then output m, else output ;.
x

r0

n

k

n

k

Kn

The di eren es between this and the original El-Gamal s heme is the
addition of the hash appended to the message, and the squaring of the
message and hash to onvert them into a quadrati residue (this makes it
an element of the quadrati residues of GF (p), the group of order q). Note
5

that in step 2 of the de ryption, if neither square root yields a orre t hash
then the output is ;.
The proof relies on the diÆ ulty of the De ision DiÆe-Hellman Problem
(DDHP), the de nition of whi h, from Cramer-Shoup, is given below.

- ([4℄, pg. 16) Let G be a group of large prime order q. Consider the following two distributions:
{ the distribution R of random quadruples (g ; g ; u ; u ) 2 G ;
{ the distribution D of quadruples (g ; g ; u ; u ) 2 G , where g ; g are
random, and u = g and u = g for random r 2 Z .
De nition 1

1

1

1

r

1

r

2

2

2

1

2

2

1

2

4

4

1

2

q

An algorithm that solves the DDHP is a statisti al test that an e e tively distinguish between these two distributions. For a given quadruple
oming from one of the two distributions, it should output 0 or 1 and there
should be a non-negligible di eren e between the probability that it outputs
1 given an input from R and the probability that it outputs 1 given an input from D. The de ision DiÆe-Hellman problem is hard if there is no su h
polynomial-time statisti s test.
The onstru tion of the proof is as follows. It is assumed an adversary
that an break the ryptosystem in the IND-CCA2 sense exists, and then
it is shown how this adversary an unwittingly be used to help solve what
is onsidered a omputationally unfeasible problem, in this ase the DDHP.
The onstru tion of the proof an be seen in Figure 1.
The input to the proof are quadruples oming from either D or R (but
not both). These go to a onstru ted simulator, whi h is responsible for,
the reation of keys, simulation of an en ryption ora le and simulation of
a de ryption ora le. The IND-CCA2 adversary re eives all its information,
in luding ora le queries, from the simulator.
The proof runs as follows. A quadruple is input. The simulator reates
a valid se ret key (on e only) and the publi key, whi h is passed to the
IND-CCA2 adversary. The adversary runs its rst stage A1 and produ es
two messages m0 and m1 . Then it passes the two messages to the simulated
en ryption ora le. The simulated en ryption ora le hooses a random bit b 2
[0; 1℄, en rypts m and passes the hallenge iphertext ba k to the adversary.
The adversary annot see the simulator's hoi e for b.
The adversary then runs its se ond stage, A2 , on the hallenge iphertext
and outputs its guess, b0 , for the random bit. Both the simulator and the
adversary pass b and b0 respe tively to a distinguisher that outputs 1 if b = b0
otherwise 0.
b
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Consider the ase when the input omes from R, the simulator is unable
to reate a valid iphertext (as the relation that quadruples from D have, are
not present in quadruples from R). This fa t will be ru ial in showing the
adversary annot su eed in guessing b with any advantage. Alternatively,
when the input omes from D, then the simulator reates a perfe tly valid
iphertext and the adversary an guess the bit b with an advantage.
Input from D or R

?

?

Simulator
Key Generation
Set up keys
Simulation of
En ryption Ora le
Simulation of
De ryption Ora le
b

-



m0 ; m1
mb



-

IND-CCA2
adversary that an
break the
ryptosystem

-

Distinguisher



b'

?

0 or 1
Figure-1: Graphi al representation for the onstru tion
of the Se ure El-Gamal proof.
Hen e by observing the distribution of 0's and 1's that are output by
the distinguisher, it an be determined whi h distribution the quadruples
are oming from. If the quadruples are oming from R then 1's will o ur
with probability 0.5 and 0's with probability 0.5. The adversary will only be
orre t half the time, as it has no advantage. If the quadruples ome from
D then the adversary has an advantage and 1's will o ur with probability
0:5 + " (where " is the adversary's non-negligible advantage) and 0's with
7

probability 0:5 ".
Hen e, by observation of the output distribution, one has a statisti al
test for the DDHP.
The onstru tion of the proof is relatively simple, however there are
several properties that must hold for the proof to be valid.



The simulator must reate a valid iphertext if the quadruple omes
from D and an invalid iphertext if the quadruple omes from R.



When the quadruple omes from D the joint distribution of the adversary's view and the random bit b must be statisti ally indistinguishable
from that in an a tual atta k.



When the quadruple omes from R the distribution of the random bit
b must be (essentially) independent from the adversary's view.

Se ure El-Gamal is se ure against adaptive hosen iphertext
atta k in the Random Ora le model assuming that the DiÆe-Hellman de ision problem is hard in the group GF (p).
Theorem 1

The proof of se urity is for a s heme that is slight variant of the El-Gamal
s heme des ribed above, but the two s hemes are inter hangeable. The
s heme used in the proof has an extra part to the iphertext, 2 . A iphertext
from the El-Gamal s heme (above) an be transformed into one for this
s heme (in the proof) by ( 1 ; 3 ) ! ( 1 ; 2 ; 3  2 ). The transformation
ba k is obvious.
First the simulator is des ribed. On input the quadruple (g1 ; g2 ; 1 ; 2 )
the simulator generates a random private key x 2 GF (p) and outputs the
publi key as y = g R .
The simulator simulates the en ryption ora le as follows. On input two
messages m0 and m1 it sele ts a random bit b 2 [0; 1℄ and omputes:
R

R

R

x

= 1R
3 = (r  2 )  (m

r

x

b

jjH (m jjr))
b

2

The simulated en ryption ora le outputs ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ), where 1 and 2 ome
from the input quadruple to the simulator.
The simulator simulates the de ryption ora le as follows. On input
( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) it omputes:
r = x1 R
w = (r 32 )

q

m = w[1(n

( hoose the square root that yields the orre t hash)
k0 )℄

8

If the simulated de ryption ora le outputs m, else it outputs ;.
The aim now is to show that when the input omes from D the simulator
simulates the en ryption and de ryption ora les perfe tly (probabilisti ally)
and the advantage of the adversary is apparent at the distinguisher. Alternatively, if the input omes from R then the output of the simulated
en ryption ora le will not be a valid iphertext in the sense that .
It is also important to note that sin e the DDHP is hard for the adversary
they annot even nd out any partial information about the se ret key that
ould be used to determine b.
The theorem follows from the following two lemmas.

- When the simulator's input omes from D, the joint distribution of the adversary's view and the hidden bit b is statisti ally indistinguishable from that in the a tual atta k.
Lemma 1

In this ase it is lear the output of the simulated en ryption ora le has
the right form as
R

x

1

2

= (g1 ) R g2 = (g1 R )
x

x

x

x

x

g2x

=y

x

R

g2x

whi h is equivalent to the output of the a tual en ryption ora le. Similarly,
the simulated de ryption ora le will a ept all valid iphertexts.
It remains to be shown that all invalid iphertexts are reje ted with overwhelming probability. If an invalid iphertext (in the sense that log 1 1 6=
log 2 2 ) is presented as a query to the de ryption ora le it will be reje ted
as the resulting r will not be orre t for re overing m from 3 . More importantly the invalid iphertext will not pass the he k involving the random
ora le (H ). By using a random ora le it is ensured that the hash is ompletely non-malleable and no partial information is leaked.
g

g

- When the simulator's input omes from R, the distribution of
the hidden bit is (essentially) independent from the adversary's view.
Lemma 2

First it will be shown that no partial information about b is leaked from
just the hallenge iphertext, this essentially is showing IND-CPA se urity.
Then it will be shown that there is only a negligible han e that the simulated de ryption ora le gives the adversary any information about b. Sin e
an IND-CCA2 adversary that annot gain any information from a de ryption ora le is equivalent to an IND-CPA adversary, the lemma is proven.
It has been shown that assuming DDHP the El-Gamal ryptosystem is
se ure in the sense of IND-CPA [3, 7℄. To show the IND-CPA se urity of this
9

s heme it will be shown how to onvert an El-Gamal hallenge iphertext
into one for this s heme. First a se ond generator needs to be reated,
if p is of the form p = 2q + 1, then there are q 1 generators. Hen e by
onsidering powers of g1 a se ond generator of the form g2 = g1 an be found
in polynomial time, with w known. So g2 an be al ulated as (g1 ) . So an
El-Gamal hallenge iphertext an be transformed into a Se ure El-Gamal
hallenge iphertext as
w

x

(g1 ; y
x

x
R

 m ) ! (g
b

1 ; g2 ;
x

x

x w

(y

x

R

g2x )

 m ):
b

It should be noted that the message is a di erent size to a message in an
a tual Se ure El-Gamal hallenge iphertext. However this is not an issue, if
p is an n bit prime, and the hash fun tion outputs 128 bits, then the han es
that two messages hosen at random do not di er in the rst n 128 bits is
128, whi h is negligible for suitable large n. The absen e of the appended
2
hash is irrelevant sin e the use of a random ora le ensures no information
about m is leaked to an IND-CPA adversary. Also, without a ess to a
de ryption ora le there is no need for a orre t hash value to be present in
the iphertext.
The simulated de ryption ora le still needs to reje t all invalid iphertexts, otherwise relevant information will be leaked. A valid iphertext is
( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ), an invalid one is ( 01 ; 02 ; 03 ). There are two ases to onsider.
1) ( 3 ) = ( 03 ). If this happens with non-negligible probability then the
random ora le must not be one way sin e 01 and 02 will reate a different r (as they are di erent from 1 and 2 ) and this will ause
de ryption to a di erent message and hash. If the hash he k passes,
then the hash has been reated without knowledge of the message.
2) ( 1 ; 2 ) = ( 01 ; 02 ). With 3 6= 03 , then the adversary has to repla e
the message and hash in 3 to reate 03 . They an't just repla e the
message as if the hash he k passes then a ollision has been found.
They an't repla e the hash, or the message and hash, as without
omplete knowledge of r the orre t hash annot be al ulated, and if
it ould then a ollision ould be found.
n

Using a random ora le means that one-wayness and ollision-freeness
annot be defeated, in fa t no partial information is leaked about the preimage of the hash. Thus, the simulated de ryption ora le will reje t all
invalid iphertexts, ex ept with negligible probability.
Hen e if the DDHP is a omputationally unfeasible problem then an
IND-CCA2 atta ker for Se ure El-Gamal annot exist.
10

4

Con lusion

This paper has shown that the one-way hash variant of the s heme by ZhengSeberry [9℄ is inse ure in the sense of IND against a hosen iphertext adversary.
A new s heme was reated, alled Se ure El-Gamal, that was shown to
be provably se ure in the random ora le model.
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